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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State appeals following the district court's order granting Brian Neal's motion
to suppress wherein the district court held that Officer Yount unlawfully extend the
scope and duration of his stop of Mr. Neal's vehicle and there were "insufficient facts to
support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity." For the reasons set forth herein, the
State has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that Officer Yount
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention of Mr. Neal longer than
necessary to effectuate the stop without his consent, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 24, 2014, at around midnight, Officer Ken Yount had initiated a traffic
stop on a vehicle, and as he completed the engagement, he observed an unoccupied
black Pontiac Bonneville and its "windows appeared to be very dark." (Prelim. Tr., p.6,
L.19 - p.7, L.13.) 1 Officer Yount drove down the street from the Pontiac to conduct
stationary patrol. (Prelim. Tr., p.7, Ls.16-21.) Approximately 40 minutes later, Officer
Yount observed the Pontiac and began tailing the vehicle. (Prelim. Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.8,
L.4.) After the vehicle failed to signal as it merged onto westbound U.S. 12, Officer
Yount continued to follow it, waiting to find a better location to initiate a traffic stop.

1 There are two separate transcripts in the appellate record. For ease of reference, the
transcript of the 5/14/14 preliminary hearing is cited herein as "Prelim. Tr." while the
transcript containing the 10/31 /14 suppression hearing and the 12/3/14 motion to
reconsider hearing is cited herein as "Tr."

1

(Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.1-19.)

Soon thereafter, Officer Yount stopped the vehicle in the

parking lot of a Jack in the Box fast food eatery. (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.11-19.)
Upon approaching the vehicle, within two minutes of the stop, Officer Yount
requested and obtained Mr. Neal's driver's license and proof of insurance. 2 (See Video
at 12:41:29 - 12:43:30.) Then, a little over two minutes into the stop, Officer Yount
inquired as to why Mr. Neal was in Lewiston, why he was sweating, and why he seemed
anxious. (R., pp.172-173.) Next, the following colloquy occurred:
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Yount:

OK. How come you're so anxious here?

Neal:

I don't know. You [inaudible] get pulled over, it's like, you know.

Yount:

OK.

Neal:

Makes you seem anxious

Yount:

You do seem anxious to me. All the property in the car belongs to
you?

Neal:

Everything.

Yount:

Any weapons or firearms in the car?

Neal:

Absolutely not.

Yount:

OK. What's on your shirt there?

Neal:

Space Needle.

Yount:

OK. Looks like a marijuana leaf there.

Neal:

Something like that.

Yount:

Yeah. Do you promote marijuana?

Neal:

No, I don't promote it. I don't think that it should be illegal, but I
don't take it. I don't partake. I don't care either way. It doesn't
matter to me. I like Seattle. I lived there for like 16 years.

Yount:

OK. Is there any marijuana in the car?

The insurance card Mr. Neal had provided was expired.
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Neal:

Absolutely not.

Yount:

OK. And you didn't have that more current insurance card?

Neal:

No, it's in the mail probably. I'm up to date.

Yount:

OK. You still seem to be sweating there in the face.

Neal:

Yeah, I know it's cause I'm hot. I got my hat on. Take my hat off.

Yount:

It's pretty cool out here.

Neal:

I know it feels good out there.

Yount:

So you're saying that there's noth ...

Neal:

[Inaudible].

Yount:

You're saying there's nothing illegal in the car at all?

Neal:

No there's nothing illegal in the car.

Yount:

And your anxiety is because you got ...

Neal:

Yeah. I do take anxiety meds.

Yount:

When we finish up here will you let me search your car?

Neal:

No, no, no I don't really want you to search my car.

Yount:

OK. Well, I think, you know, based on how you're acting I think
there's something in the car you shouldn't have. Is there any reason
a narcotics k9 will alert to anything?

Neal:

No. No.

Yount:

OK. Well I'm gonna go request one come out here.

Neal

Alright.

Yount:

OK. Any paraphernalia or anything?

Neal:

Nope.

Yount

OK. Now you're starting to breathe heavier.
3

Neal:

Sir, you're giving me the third degree. I don't have nothing wrong
with me.

Yount:

I'm just asking you simple questions, and you're beginning to
sweat more from your face.

(R., pp.13-15; Video at 12:44:20-12:48:58.)
Officer Yount then ordered Mr. Neal out of the vehicle and made him stand
front of his police cruiser.

(Video at 12:47:30.)

information into dispatch and requested backup.

in

Officer Yount called Mr. Neal's

(Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.9-24.) Officer

Yount also requested a K-9 police unit, but, at about 15 minutes into the stop, learned
that the K-9 officer was off duty and had been sleeping and would need some additional
time prior to arrival. (Video at 12:53:40 - 12:55:10.) When the K-9 officer asked how
long Officer Yount had been on the stop, Officer Yount was less than honest, stating,
"about 5 now." (Video at 12:54:53.) Officer Yount then spent a significant amount of
time attempting to determine whether Mr. Neal's probation out of the state of
Washington would give him the ability to search Mr. Neal's vehicle. (Video at 12:47:32
- 1:02:30.) The K-9 unit arrived on the scene at 1:07 a.m., approximately 26 minutes
after the vehicle had been stopped. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.1-3.) Officer Yount then tested

3

As to this comment by Officer Yount, the district court noted,
On the video, Trooper Yount repeatedly asks Neal if he has illegal drugs,
firearms, or other weapons in the vehicle and repeatedly asks why he is
nervous and sweating. When Neal continuously explains he has an
anxiety disorder and is nervous because of the trooper's questions, Yount
tells Neal he is just asking him simple questions. The Court finds Yount's
response disingenuous. While such questions may be routine for Trooper
Yount, to a motorist stopped for a very minor infraction, the repeated
questions are understandably perceived, coming from someone in a
position of authority, as accusatory and totally unrelated to the reason for
the stop.

(R., p.199.)
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the tint of the windows, which took which took a little over one minute to complete.
(Video 1:09:25- 1:10:32.) At 1.11:53, the K-9 unit was deployed on the vehicle and the
canine purportedly alerted. (Video 1:11 53 - 1.15:00.) It is unclear if any of the actual
citations were prepared during the actual stop or until after Mr. Neal's arrest.
(R., p.211.)
Officers then searched the vehicle and Mr. Neal was arrested for possession of
drug paraphernalia.

(R., p.194.) A subsequent search at the Nez Perce County jail

uncovered a sock in Mr. Neal's underwear containing "a plastic baggy with a black tarlike substance believed to be heroin, a second plastic baggie that contained a large
piece of crystal substance believed to be methamphetamine, and a third plastic baggy
with four yellow pills later identified as hydrocodone." (R., p.194.)
Mr. Neal was charged by Information with trafficking in heroin and possession of
a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp.94-95, 115-116.) Defense counsel
for Mr. Neal filed a motion to suppress and supporting memorandum, arguing that: ( 1)
Officer Yount did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Mr. Neal after his
initial investigation into the traffic citations; (2) Officer Yount did not possess any
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to prolong Mr. Neal's detention to wait for a drug
detection dog; and (3) Officer Yount violated Mr. Neal's Fourth Amendment rights by
unlawfully prolonging the detention. (R., pp 117-119, 127-148.)
The district court agreed, first finding it "troubling that Trooper Yount's actions at
the time of the stop are inconsistent with his articulated suspicion and that a review of
the video belies the trooper's description of Neal's physical appearance and behavior."
(R., pp.198-199.) Rather, the district court found that "[o]n the video, Neal exhibits no
jittery behavior and is instead seen standing quite still for a significant period of time."
5

(R., p.199.) Next, the district court observes that "Trooper Yount testified he suspected
Neal was driving under the influence of drugs, yet he took no investigative action to
confirm or dispel his suspicion" until after Mr. Neal was arrested.

(R., p.199.)

The

district court concluded that 'Trooper Yount requested an off-duty K-9 unit respond on
what can only be characterized as hunch or speculation in order to provide some basis
to perform a warrantless and presumptively unreasonable search." (R., p.199.) Based
upon its view of the facts presented and Officer Yount's credibility, the district court held
that "there were insufficient facts to support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity" and
"Trooper Yount unlawfully extended the stop to buy time for a narcotics dog to arrive in
hopes of confirming a speculative hunch that Neal possessed drugs." (R., p.200.) As a
result, the district court granted Mr. Neal's motion to suppress. (R., p.201.)
The State filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.221-223.)

6

ISSUE
Has the State failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that Officer Yount
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention longer than necessary to
effectuate the stop without Mr. Neal's consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution?
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ARGUMENT
The State Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That Officer
Yount Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer Than Necessary
To Effectuate The Stop Without Mr. Neal's Consent, In Violation Of The Fourth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I, § 17 Of The Idaho
Constitution

A

Introduction
After Mr. Neal was stopped for a rather innocuous lane change violation and

suspicion that the tinting on the windows of his vehicle was too dark, Officer Yount
interrogated Mr. Neal in an attempt to search Mr. Neal's vehicle. After Mr. Neal refused
to consent to a search of his vehicle, Officer Yount then spent a significant amount of
time investigating whether he could use Mr. Neal's probation in Washington to
circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution.
Again failing, Officer Yount delayed his official duties to wait for the arrival of a
K-9 unit to conduct a sniff on the vehicle. In granting the motion to suppress and finding
that "Officer Yount extended the stop to buy time for a narcotics dog to arrive in hopes
of confirming a speculative hunch that Neal possessed drugs[,]" the district court openly
questioned the Officer Yount's veracity and condemned his treatment of Mr. Neal during
the extended stop.

B.

Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate

Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review:

the Court will accept the trial court's

findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum,
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009).

"The Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact if
8

supported by substantial evidence." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The
Court "has defined 'substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion, it is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance."' Id. (quoting Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478 (1993)). "At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court."

State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct App. 2014). The Court exercises free review of
"the trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found." State v.

Danney, 153 Idaho 408 (2012). "Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." State v. Russo,
157 Idaho 299, 307 (2014) (quoting Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Mussell, 139
Idaho 28, 33 (2003)).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable and thus, violations of the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288 (1995). However, the state may rebut this presumption
by establishing that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement, or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.

Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290. If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search
must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
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C.

The Duration Of The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended While Officer Yount
Waited For The Drug Detection Dog To Arrive To Accommodate His Hunch
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the occupants that implicates the

Fourth

Amendment

guarantee

against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Law enforcement may stop a person for

a brief, investigatory detention if the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws, or that the vehicle or
occupant has been, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity.

United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (citations omitted); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650

(Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119 (Ct App. 1999)
(citations omitted). 'The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable
cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal
security of the suspect" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[A]n investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop." Id. "Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the
least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a
short period of time." Id. (citations omitted). "It is the State's burden to demonstrate
that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." Id.
The United States Supreme Court unequivocally has asserted that, "reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of
questioning limited to the purpose of the stop." Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis
added).

It is well established that an investigative detention "must be temporary and

last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," and a citizen
"may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing
10

so." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651-52 (citing Royer, 460 US. at 498, 500). Furthermore,
although the stop of the vehicle may be of short duration, if the continued detention of
the driver unreasonably extends beyond the length necessary for the purpose of the
stop, the continued detention of the driver without any reasonable suspicion to support
such inquiry is violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 652 (citing United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10 th Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10 th Cir. 1995)); United States v.
Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001 )).

Most recently, the United States Supreme Court reiterated, in the context of the
stop resulting in a dog sniff, "[t]he critical question then, is not whether the dog sniff
occurs before the officer issues a ticket .. but whether conducting the sniff 'prolongs'i.e., adds time to-'the stop[.]"'

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616

(2015); see also State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The [Supreme]
Court emphasized that the stop was not lengthened by the use of the dog") (discussing
the decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). In Rodriguez, the United
States Supreme Court explained: "Like a Terry stop,[4) the tolerable duration of police
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'-to address
the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Id.
(internal citations omitted).

The Court reiterated that "[b]ecause addressing the

infraction is the purpose of the stop, [the detention] may 'last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks
tied to the infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Id. (internal
citations omitted). The Court recognized that an officer "may conduct certain unrelated

4

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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checks during an otherwise lawful stop.

But

.. he may not do so in a way that

prolongs the stop absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individuaL

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In Rodriguez, "[t]he Government argue[d] that an officer may 'incremental[ly]'
prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in
pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop
remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar
circumstances" Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616. However, the Supreme Court rejected
that argument:
The Government's argument, in effect, is that by completing all trafficrelated tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an
unrelated criminal investigation.
The reasonableness of a seizure,
however, depends on what the police in fact do. . . . If an officer can
complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of
"time reasonably required to complete [the stop's] mission." As we said in
Cabal/es and reiterate today, a traffic stop "prolonged beyond" that point is
"unlawful." The critical question then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs
before the officer issues a ticket, ... but whether conducting the sniff
"prolongs"-i.e., adds time to-"the stop[.]"
Id. (internal citations omitted).

On appeal, the State reargues the facts presented to the district court to this
Court, now seeking the opposite result.

However, the district court's legal conclusion

was based in large part on its view of Officer Yount's veracity and ulterior motive to
search Mr. Neal's vehicle rather than complete his constitutionally permissible duties as
a state trooper with the Idaho State Police. In fact, the district court described Officer
Yount's statement that he was just asking simple questions as "disingenuous," found it
"troubling" that Officer Yount's actions at the time of the stop were inconsistent with "his
articulated suspicion," and most importantly, that the Court's "review of the video belies
the trooper's description of Neal's physical appearance and behavior."

12

(R., pp.198-

200.) Thus, the district court's legal conclusion, that Officer Yount's extended detention
was not supported by sufficient facts "to support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity"
is based upon its view of Officer Yount's credibility and assessment of factual inferences
in the case, all of which is vested in the trial court. Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570 ("At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court."). 5
The State also argues that the district court failed to consider that Officer Yount
became aware Mr. Neal was on probation in Washington and "[a] restriction on travel
outside of the jurisdiction of probation is a common condition of probation." (Appellant's
Brief, p.9 (emphasis added).) The State also writes, "And not only was a geographic
restriction in fact a condition of Neal's probation, based on that condition, it appears that
Neal was violating his probation by being in the state of Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
Thus, based on not one, but two assumptions, the State argues, "That Sergeant Yount
had encountered Neal outside of the jurisdiction of his probation objectively provided the
officer with 'the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual,' allowing the officer to expand his investigation into potential probation
violations." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
Aside from the fact that the State is asking this Court to find an officer's unknown
hunches amounts to reasonable suspicion, contrary to established precedent, the State

While the State does appear to argue that the district court's factual finding that the
video did not support Officer Yount's description of Mr. Neal's physical appearance and
behavior based upon its own view of the video, without the benefit of viewing Officer
Yount's in court testimony, the State fails to cite to authority for its proposition. As such,
by foregoing its opportunity to present argument or authority as to the merits of its claim,
the State has waived any objection that it may have had to the merits its claim of a
clearly erroneous factual finding by the district court, although ultimately meritless. See
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if
either authority or argument is lacking .... ")
5
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cites to no authority for its assumption that Officer Yount would have any authority,
much less jurisdiction, to enforce the terms of Mr. Neal's Washington probation. See

State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if
either authority or argument is lacking ... ")

In addition, the State has not offered any

evidence that Mr. Neal failed to get permission from his probation officer to travel
outside of the state of Washington, if that is in fact required by his probation agreement.
Even more troubling, in an attempt to manufacture a reason to search Mr. Neal's
vehicle, Officer Yount devotes a large portion of his time to investigating the terms of
Mr. Neal's probation, when he could have been completing Mr. Neal's citations6 or
measuring the vehicle's window tint.
Accordingly, in light of the reasons set forth in the district court's order granting
Mr. Neal's and as argued herein, the State has failed to show error in the district court's
order granting Mr. Neal's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Neal respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
granting Mr. Neal's motion to suppress.
DATED this 29 th day of September, 2015.

Officer Yount testified that it takes four or five minutes to write a citation for no
insurance. (Tr., p.24, Ls.16-18.)

6
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